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The Economic Impact of the Saldanha Steel Project on Firms in the 
Saldanha/Langebaan/V elddrif Area 
(Abstract) 
By Lee Warren Ruthenberg 
This paper examines whether the Saldanha Steel Project has made a significant impact on firms 
in the Saldanha/Vredenburg!Langebaan area. The building of the steel plant is the anchor project 
of a government regional policy initiative called the West Coast Investment Initiative. 
The paper's examination begins with a theoretical overview of regional industrial policy in 
general and Spatial Development Initiatives (SDI) in particular. It then contextualises the West 
Coast as a region earmarked as a SDI and describes the Iscor and Industrial Development 
Cotporation's joint venture - Saldanha Steel Project (SSP). A questionnaire survey sought to 
establish the impact that the Saldanha Steel Project was having on firm's activity and economic 
prospects in the West Coast Area. 
International experience as well as South Africa's previous experience points to key aspects of 
successful interventions in the space economy. Firstly, governments have to select areas and 
projects carefully. Projects chosen should reflect the market demand. Secondly, long term 
success will require that key or anchor projects not only succeed themselves, but that side-effects 
from anchor projects help promote the region's economic capacity, co-operation between 
economic players and the ability of the region to attract further investment. With this in mind, the 
process of constructing the steel plant and the SSP's procurement policy should seek to maximize 
the benefits to local firms. 
A questionnaire survey of local firms involved with the Saldanha Steel Project was the means by 
which information was collected. The responses of local firms dealt with business prospects in 
the area, experiences with the Saldanha Steel Project in the construction phase and the impact the 
project had on firms. 
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The paper concludes that the Saldanha Steel Project did have some positive side effects for the 
local business community. Firms have adapted to become more competitive, learned how to deal 
with large industrial projects and the region has expanded the range of goods and services it is 
capable of delivering. The SSP's procurement policy supporting local firms had gone some way 
to improving local business' capacity. The paper identifies certain characteristics which make 
certain firms successful under the given circumstances, addresses problems local firms faced 
dealing with a large scale capital project and suggests measures to best help promote the 
prospects of local firms in future. 
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The much-needed economic development in South Africa must be sustainable. Spatial 
development programs are one measure the government has undertaken to address this priority. 
These regionally focused policy interventions have been named Spatial Development Initiatives 
(SDI's). The Saldanha Steel Project is the anchor project of the West Coast Investment Initiative. 
This joint venture between Iscor and the Industrial Development Corporation forms the main 
thrust of the SDI aimed at the West Coast region. 
International experience, as well as South Africa's previous attempts at regional policy, provide 
useful information about the nature and the potential success or failure of regional economic 
initiatives. With the above in mind this paper looks at the economic impact that the Saldanha 
Steel Project has had on local firms in the Saldanha!Vredenburg!Langebaan area. 
Chapter 1 begins with a brief overview of the theory of regional economic development. 
International and local experience are examined and provide some guide to successful regional 
policy. South Africa's past regional development policies are reviewed and the policy of Spatial 
Development Initiatives (SDI's) is defined. 
Chapter 2 outlines the West Coast Spatial Development Initiative and provides a profile of the 
West Coast's geography, history, people and infrastructure. Chapter 3 describes the Saldanha 
Steel Project (SSP), the choice of site and technology as well as the SSP as part of West Coast 
Investment Initiative. Chapter 4 examines the Saldanha Steel Project's impact on the 
development of firms in the region. This impact is assessed using the results of a questionnaire 
survey conducted amongst local firms in the Saldanha!Vredenburg!Langebaan area. Chapter 5 
gives the conclusions of the survey and makes some policy suggestions for large capital projects 






























Outline of Regional Policy Issues and Spatial Development Initiatives 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the Second World War industrial and developing countries have devoted significant 
resources to industrial and regional policies. Through countrywide industrial policies, 
governments strive for goals which include the development of domestic markets, creation of key 
industries, import substitution, export promotion and others. 
Apart from nation-wide economic concerns regional policies are also common. Renaud 
(1979:98-99) outlines the multiple objectives of urbanisation strategy or regional policy of 
developing countries. Different objectives may be emphasised by different governments or at 
various times in a country's industrial history. The objectives include: 
1. Integration of peripheral areas into the national economy to increase the domestic market 
(raising national and regional demand). 
2. Incorporating outlying areas to add resources to the economy and raise national output. 
3. Reduction of interregional disparities (reflecting concerns of regional/spatial equity in addition 
to equity between households). 
4. The development of outlying border regions for national security purposes. 
5. Regional development to improve political integration and social cohesion. Also helping to 
avoid social or political splintering from the nation as a whole. 
6. Improvement of the national system of cities or growth areas adds to a nations economic 
potential. In theory, medium sized cities with improving economies of scale should assist 





























Currently South African policy-makers are concerned primarily with attracting new investment to 
previously disadvantaged areas and promoting employment and growth opportunities in these 
areas. South Africa's regional policy includes elements of almost all Renaud's objectives. 
The macroeconomic strategy to target the inherent and under-utilised economic potential of 
certain areas of South Africa has been dubbed "Spatial Development Initiative" (SDI) by the 
Departments of Transport and Trade and Industry. 
1.2 International Experience in Reiional Policy 
In general international experience stands as a firm warning to all governments attempting to 
manipulate the space economy. The agglomeration economies or simply the socio-economic 
attraction of established metropoles are very strong. The strong economic pull of established 
economic centres makes attracting new firms and investment to outer areas (whether to ease 
congestion or spread resources more evenly) very difficult. 
Large metropoles offer established physical and social infrastructure as well as extensive inter-
firm linkages. These large metropoles offer firms easy access to the services they require and 
access to markets to sell their own goods. For these reasons firms will be reluctant to move far 
from the advantages of an established centre. At the same time policy makers attempting to 
designate new areas of development nearer (but not in) existing metropoles must realise these 
new firms will face stiff competition from the established area. 
Government attempts that encourage industry to establish outside of existing agglomerations 
have constantly struggled. Some strong trends are to be found internationally, not all will apply 
to every regional project, but their warning must be heeded (Lee, 1989:45).1 
1 Kyu Sik Lee's fmdings in Bogota and Cali confirmed stylised facts evident in North America as well as Seoul and 
other developing areas. The patterns of city growth he describes, he believes to be applicable to both developing and 
developed countries. 
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1. Finns will move, but not very far. "Far" in this sense is extremely relative. Lee (1991:4) 
describes a situation in Thailand of an attempted development only 23 kilometers from the 
major centre that was deemed "too far" by local entrepreneurs. 
2. Finns respond differently to location attributes. 
3. Finns will not generally move because of incentives, but rather to escape a constraint in their 
current area of operation. 
4. Small firms are especially reluctant to establish outside of metropoles as they rely heavily on 
the agglomeration economies in towns or cities. 
The international trends above suggest that implementing spatial policies effectively is difficult. 
Industrial metropoles located in Gauteng, Cape Town and the Durban/Pietermaritzburg area 
dominate South African Industrial activity. At the same time, however, these centres are not 
substantially overcrowded and/or congested and so-called diseconomies of agglomeration are not 
prevalent as in the case of some other nations. In short, this makes the task of "spreading 
growth" to other areas all the more difficult since the large metropoles remain attractive for 
industrialists. The goal in South Africa is, however, not to repel investment away from the cities, 
but rather to make positive strategic interventions in the chosen regions that would induce new 
investment in these regions (ISP, undated: 2). 
1.2.1 The move to a new emphasis in reKi.onal policy 
Any industrial policy action in South Africa has to focus on the alleviation of poverty, through 
sustainable development and job creation. Impressively a number of the East Asian countries 
have succeeded in doing what South African policy makers are now attempting. Two important 
criteria for successful spatial interventions are seen to be increasingly important. ( 1) The 
development of "social capital"2 in the region concerned and (2) the provision of the "correct" 
kind of infrastructural investment based strongly on market demand. 
2 Morgan {1995:4) gives Putnam's (1993) definition of Social capital. It refers to: 
" .. features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust, that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation 
for mutual benefit. Social Capital enhances the benefit of investment in physical and human capital and is coming to 
be seen as a vital ingredient in economic development around the world". 
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1.2.1.1 Co-QPerative behaviour and Social Capital 
Morgan (1995) emphasises that more important than the final product of a particular regional 
investment, is the process of building "collective learning capacity" which he terms social capital. 
The concept of social capital reflects the idea that innovation or development is an interactive 
process and that this process is shaped by the institutional routines and social conventions of an 
area. 
With the relative success of some regional growth policies in the Newly Industrialised Asian 
countries, more attention has been given to the factors that make traditional centres or existing 
metropoles successful. 
In a similar vein Bloch (1990) called for more study on the "interplay" between industrial 
organisation, technological change and labour markets in South Africa's large urbanised areas. If 
this interplay were analysed it could uncover further guidelines as to what government might do 
in targeted outlying regions. The interplay or co-ordination between economic agents in an area 
is also a part of the area's "social capital". 
This idea of "collective learning capacity" is central to the success of any regional investment 
program. In any particular regional project the physical and infrastructural goals of the project 
are less important than the creation of the "capacity for action" (Morgan, 1995). The creation or 
development of social capital will mean an improvement in a region's "capacity for action". 
During an investment project, say for instance, the construction of a large steel mill like Saldanha 
Steel, does the State, corporate business, local firms, town councils, labour etc. learn and develop 
ways in which they can best co-ordinate their resources. The nature of many regional projects 
means that a large initial capital investment originates outside the targeted area, but the process of 
development i.e. the gathering and efficient utilisation of investments and resources, must be 
endogenized. Simply, local firms and authorities must improve their capacity to attract and 
sustain investment in the future. 
5 
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The idea of endogenizing the growth process is emphasised by Lee (1996) when he talks about 
Hirschman's3 notion of "the centrality of side-effects". 
Lee notes that a policy, which attempted "project induced development", was successful when the 
project induced side effects that contributed to growth, expansion and sustainability. In Kyu Sik 
Lee's (1996: 23-26) evaluation of a very successful regional development in Cholla, South Korea, 
three "side effects" brought about by the public sector's anchor project investment were 
identified. Firstly, the development of backward and forward linkages. That is to say industrial 
development occurs around the "anchor project" on both the input and output side respectively. 
This has also been termed up-stream and down-stream development. Logically there would have 
to be some attractive qualities of the anchor project and/or the area to ensure that up/downstream 
industries established nearby. 
Secondly, an "entrepreneurial" local public service which is active and instrumental in assisting 
industrial development- above and beyond the provision of basic services. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the private sector becomes engaged in the development of 
the area. Be it from local or external sources, the anchor project "excites" continued private 
activity and investment in the area. 
Storper and Walker (1989:95-96) believe that human and physical resources can be created in the 
process of regional industrialisation. It is industries and the growth in industrial activity that 
creates regional resources and not the other way around. This idea implies that the process of 
building a project or the process of growth in an area is more important that the chosen region's 
original resource endowments. There is scope for regional investment to induce an increase in a 
region's capacity. 
3 Hirchman, Albert 0. (1995) Deyelo.pment PrQjects Observed. The Brookings Institution. Washington D.C. 
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The key question will be: Has the project or investment induced improvements in the region's 
capacity for economic action? Chapter Three of this study looks at possible changes within local 
firms that may point to their improved "capacity for action". Have, for example, local firms 
increased in size, learned new skills, specialised or diversified? 
A significant danger of regionally targeted investment, especially large capital projects or so-
called anchor projects, is that the development simply becomes an enclave. A once off, stand-
alone development should not be the goal of a regional project. The process of generating new 
investment must be endogenized within the region if the above is to be prevented. The 
sustainability of any initiated growth will, in part, be determined by the ability of the community 
to continue to attract new investment long after the initial policy intervention (Gore, 1984 in 
Lewis and Bloch, 1997:12). 
The large public expenditures proposed for various SDI's will naturally have immediate 
economic impact on the regions, but the sustainability of this impact will require the refinement 
of co-operational capacity or "social capital" amongst all socio-economic players. The manner in 
which local firms, authorities and investors adapt or react to the initial investments will determine 
the ultimate success or failure ofthe project. 
1.2.1.2 Larie Inftastructural investment and SMME' s 
The kind of infrastructural investment that a government chooses if it decides to influence the 
space economy needs to be carefully considered. Lee ( 1991) points out that these investments 
should reflect market demand. This fact has particular resonance when we consider that 
infrastructural demand of firms of different sizes vary greatly. 
Larger manufacturing firms, like a steel producer, will move to any area that best support their 
infrastructural needs. A good road and rail network, a suitable port if the manufacturer is an 
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Needs are completely different for smaller firms. Small, medium and micro enterprises 
(SMME's) in particular have been recognized as having specific infrastructural needs. As was 
mentioned earlier, SMMEs rely heavily on the services that arise from the infrastructural 
characteristics of established major centres. Lee (1991:22) says small firms are not attracted by 
the same infrastructure that attracts large manufacturers. Land prices, bulk transport facilities and 
even lower labour costs are not good incentives for the re-location or establishment of smaller 
firms. Set-up cost for SMMEs are relatively high and they tend to avoid increasing delivery and 
employee commuting distances. Most importantly SMMEs locate close to other SMMEs because 
of their need to be close to local input and product markets. Lee (1989:45) believes the above 
point to be true of both developing and developed countries. The proximity to markets and short 
commuting distances for employees tend to compensate for higher rents and sometimes-
congested costs in central areas. 
The point is that industrial policy makers must realise that providing infrastructural investments 
of one particular kind, will attract firms of mostly one particular kind and they must make sure 
that their ''planning for industries must be consistent with the locational needs of individual firms 
of different types" (Lee, 1991 :22). 
1.3 Decentralisation in South Africa 
Decentralisation policies or attempts to manipulate the spatial economy are not new in South 
Africa. The South African government adopted a concerted policy of industrial decentralisation 
in 1956. This policy was an integral part of the broader policy of"separate development". The 
system provided incentives for industries locating in government declared growth points. In 1968 
the Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act was passed, this legislation limited further 
employment of Africans in manufacturing industries in the then Pretoria-Witwatersrand-
Johannesburg region and other established metropoles. This was a further attempt to force 
industrial decentralisation (Maasdorp, 1990: 128). 
8 
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Incentive based decentralisation policies expanded through the 1970's and 1980's, focusing on 
the then homeland states and other designated regions. The rationale behind these policies should 
be seen in the light of the apartheid government's goals of the time. Visions of separate 
development, the growth of politically strategic industries and a general emphasis on import 
substitution overshadowed regional concerns of per capita income equality, revitalising stalled 
areas and reducing inter area growth differentials. 
By 1990, economic pundits and the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA), seemed to agree 
that the South African decentralisation policy was severely flawed and inefficient (Maasdorp, 
1990:136). Merle Holden4 concluded that development of growth points, together with the 
incentives given to firms to relocate were extremely expensive and inefficient. Bloch (1990: 152) 
noted that industrial growth pole efforts had focused on political and ideological goals rather than 
economic ends. Furthermore the policies were changed too often and too many areas were 
undertaken for development to be successful. 
Reviewing South Africa regional economic policies up to 1990, Tomlinson (1990) and Maasdorp 
(1990) suggested future policy guidelines. 
1. Regions should be selected primarily on the basis of resource endowment and economic 
potential. 
2. A small number of regions should be earmarked and sites should be of a size where "external 
economies" can begin to be realised. 
3. A movement away form incentive-based approaches was advised especially long-term input-
specific incentives. 
4. Regional initiatives should under no circumstance involve the deliberate stiffling of economic 
activity in existing metropoles. 





















5. Care should be taken that national industrial, trade or monetary policies work in harmony with 
attempts at spatial growth. 5 
In summary, international experience says that regional decentralisation policies struggle against 
the strong agglomeration economies of established cities and that incentive based approaches 
have seldom succeeded. South Africa's experiences before 1990 bear this out, as incentive based 
approaches to regional development have been unsuccessful in generating significant growth in 
outlying areas. Regional policy has to focus on investments that improve the economic capacity 
of a chosen area. Selected projects must impact upon local firms and other institutions, 
enhancing the areas ability to attract further investment. 
1.3.1 The Theozy of Spatial Development Initiatives (SDI's) 
Spatial Development Initiatives represent South Africa's current attempt at affecting the regional 
economy. They form part of the national government's effort to raise levels of industrial 
development, competitive performance and exports, but differ from other national industrial 
policy measures by their spatial (or regional) focus. 
The driving mechanism behind the SDI program is that private investment be "crowded in" or 
attracted through selected public sector interventions in a chosen region. These interventions 
may include public sector and I or parastatal financial support for infrastructural projects and 
"anchor projects". 
A selected staff is assigned to each SDI region and charged with identifying investment 
opportunities within the region as well as seeking out and encouraging potential private investors 
(Lewis & Bloch, 1997:14-15). 
5 Most of the above points are acknowledged in the current SDI framework, discussed later. 
10 
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The key objectives or goals of the SDI process can be broadly defined as follows: (De Beer & 
Arkwright, 1996:2). 
1. The generation of sustainable economic growth and development in designated 
underdeveloped areas, defined by the areas inherent economic potential. 
2. The generation of sustainable employment for local populations in the chosen SDI area. 
3. SDis will attempt to maximise private sector investment accompanying public investments 
and joint ventures. The active drive to "crowd in" private investments will aid the already 
thinly stretched public development budget. The initiative's goal will also be to focus these 
"crowded in" investments on uplifting and empowering local communities and especially 
SMMEs. 
4. The SDis also wish to channel the areas inherent economic potential toward export oriented 
growth. With this in mind there is an emphasis on the provision of supply-side measures to 
encourage this. 
De Beer & Arkwright (1996) describe "compelling reasons" for Government's support of SDis. 
Firstly, through the SDI process Government demonstrates its commitment to mobilising public 
and private funds for the purpose of developmental investment. It also does this in areas which 
often have, both, inherent under-utilised economic potential and have been neglected or poorly 
developed in the past. 
Secondly, the SDI goals are also clearly in line with many of the Government's stated objectives, 
especially with regards to sustainable employment creation, export oriented growth and efficient 
use of natural and economic resources. 
Thirdly, the time frame within which SDI programs can be planned, prepared and mobilised is 
fairly short relative to other development type programs. This relatively compressed time frame 
is essential in building private sector excitement and helps "crowd in" investment often on the 
back of a high profile anchor project. Naturally the speed and visibility of SDis also assist the 
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Finally and perhaps most significantly from a South African perspective, it is the "redistributive 
character represented in the regionally-targeted industrialisation programs that accounts for the 
unusual degree of popular resonance associated with the SDI program".(Lewis & Bloch, 1997:1). 
The SDis embody a commitment to investment in less favoured regions (LFRs) and to a slightly 
lesser extent encourage the progress of SMMEs, both of which underline the Government's focus 
on assisting the margianalised and disadvantaged. 
1.3 .2 Expectations for the SDI 
SDI are expected to make considerable economic contributions at national, regional and local 
level. The following sections examine the west Coast SDI, focussing on the SDI anchor project's 
effect on local firms. The Saldanha Steel anchor project is by far the largest component of the 
West Coast Investment lnitiative6 and as such examining the economic impact of the project on 
local firms is important. To judge the success of policy, one must consider the experiences and 
reactions of local firms with respect to the theory set out above. The regional investment must 
improve the capacity, competitiveness and efficiency of local firms and industry. The process of 
building a SDI "anchor project" should assist and encourage these improvements as much as 
possible. Ultimately the public funds invested in SDI programs must culminate in sustainable 
growth and job creation for the country as a whole and for the region in particular. 
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The West Coast Spatial Development Initiative 7 
At the time of writing the West Coast Investment Initiative (WCII) is one of eight Spatial 
Development Initiatives in South Africa. The WCII is focused on the opportunities created by 
the building of a steel mini-mill at Saldanha as well as under-utilised opportunities in agriculture, 
tourism and fishing in the region {Appraisal document, 1997). This section gives an outline of 
the features of the West Coast area. The combination of these features made the area a candidate 
for the SDI program. 
Profile of the West Coast Re~on 
2.1 Geography of the Reiion 
The area demarcated for the West Coast Investment Initiative8 lies between Atlantis in the South 
and Vredendal in the North.9 To the East it extends to the escarpment including Malmesbury and 
Citrusdal, and to the west it extends to the Atlantic coast. Within this region lie the West Coast 
sea belt and adjoining nature reserves, the Saldanha-Vredenburg urban and industrial areas, the 
Swartland agricultural area and the irrigation agriculture area along the Olifants, Verloren and 
Berg Rivers. 
Climatically the West Coast region falls into the winter rainfall region of South Africa. Up to 
Saldanha Bay the climate is described as Mediterranean, but moving from Saldanha, northwards 
the climate is semi-arid with notable Summer drought. The cold Benguella current ensures a 
generally cool temperature with an annual mean of about l8°C. The cool ocean is also 
7 A general overview of the West Coast is acquired from various sources: Driver et al (1993), Fitschen (1996), 
Martin et al ( 1996), Provincial Development Document ( 1997), van der Merwe et al ( 1990), wen Document ( 1996) 
8 The West Coast SDI has been named the West Coast Investment Initiative (WCn) 






 (  
sm
QP






 18° . 
,  : t
 t l  WCII 
•  Ol b   i ell











responsible for a high incidence of fog especially north of Yzerfontein and this fog ts an 
important source of moisture for the coastal areas. 
2.2 Historical Overview 
The existing ownership of resources and control in the West Coast has its roots in the Eighteenth 
century. During this time the West Coast was the "northern frontier" of European settlement and 
the conflictual situation between white farmers and indigenous nomadic people is characteristic 
of the regions entire modem history. Nomadic stock farmers were gradually forced into wage 
labour as white farmers claimed more and more land, which later became officially privately 
owned white farmers land. 
In the nineteenth century Malmesbury and Picketberg were established as towns which served the 
farming areas. The only exceptions to complete white ownership of land were "coloured 
reserves" at Ebanezer and Elandskloof, both of which have complex histories of marginalization. 
Besides farming land the West Coast has extensive marine resources which formed the basis for 
coastal communities. The establishment of large commercial fishing companies led to massive 
changes to small traditional fishing communities along the coast. Saldanha itself became an 
established fishing harbour and its significance increased during the Second World War when a 
pipeline providing fresh water was constructed from the Berg River. The West Coast road (R27) 
has been the main cause of further West Coast development since the war. 10 
2.3 Recent History 
It is certainly the West Coast areas recent history that makes it a strong candidate for a possible 
SDI project. The allocation of mining rights, increased tourism and ambitious state industrial 
projects have left an area with inherent economic potential and at the same time an almost 
completely marginalized and disenfranchised "non white" community. 

























For the purpose of this paper which focuses on the development around the Saldanha Steel anchor 
project the most significant feature of the years 1960-1980 was the then Nationalist 
Government's industrial policy of decentralisation. In the West Coast the focus of this 
decentralisation was the intention to create a large industrial centre around Saldanha-Vredenburg 
in the 1970's. Iscor had expanded its open cast, steel ore mine at Sishen and had decided to 
export steel. After some lobbying the harbour at Saldanha was proposed as the port of export. A 
railway line of some 860km was constructed linking Sishen and Saldanha. A smelting mill at 
Saldanha was also part of the original proposal, but was never constructed. This left Saldanha 
exporting bulk quantities of iron ore (Burman et al, 1974 in Driver et al, 1993). 
The growing towns of Vredenburg and Saldanha were constructed very much according to 
apartheid policy blueprints. Racially seperated residential zones and the Coloured Labour 
Preference Act of 1955 limited the number of permanent black workers in the region. The 
relatively small percentage of permanent black residents in the West Coast Region is still very 
prevalent today, as is the continued separateness of white and coloured areas. 
Without the smelter the West Coast region's industrial development remained secondary to the 
primary activities of agriculture and fishing. The establishment of the West Coast Nature 
Reserve led the way toward tourism growing as an important factor in the regional economy. 
As a region the West Coast has been the focus of a number of plans, policy initiatives and 
investments. These included the Sishen Railway, the extension of the harbour, the buiding of a 
military base and military academy and others. Despite these attempts (which often caused spurts 
of development) the area has not grown to the extent that was hoped (Fitschen, 1997). 
2.4 Demo~aphics 
The important demographic issues directly concerning the West Coast Investment Initiative are 
























coloured households, the loss of young skilled labour to major centres, educational vacuums and 
the lack of stable employment. 
2.4.1 Population 
1991 Population statistics show the entire West Coast region to number about 0.52 % of the 
national and 6% of the provincial population. The coloured population amounts to 57.91% of the 
total, with whites about 25% and blacks, at a relatively low percentage nationally speaking, 
16.63%. The low black population which is also 82 % male is mainly due to coloured labour 
practice laws mentioned earlier. 
The dynamics of the population in the region reveal trends that are important to economic 
growth. Young people are leaving the region for further education or in search for jobs, this loss 
is balanced by relatively unskilled job seekers from less well off areas, skilled graduates taking 
up jobs with national companies or local government and the settlement of retired people. 
2.4.2 Education 
The West Coast Region has on average lower educational levels than the provincial average. 
Very low tertiary education percentag s, with only 4,6% of the population holding diplomas and 
1,5 % holding degrees and a large 11 % percent of the workforce being uneducated were 
noteworthy and worrying statistics. Poor education levels and the tendency of young educated 
people to move to the cities are factors that could hinder industrial development in the area. In 
the longer term, establishing various educational institutions or upgrading those currently existing 
will form part of the solution. Presently, rapid industrial growth, if it occurs, will have to draw 
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As far as basic infrastructure is concerned, the West Coast area is relatively well off. With an eye 
on industrial development, the region has the following infrastructural features. 
Electricity is adequately provided at costs that are relatively inexpensive in the country. The 
near-by Koeberg Nuclear Power Station supplies the electricity and Eskom is confident of 
meeting the electrical needs of the area in the future. Electrification of outlying rural areas will 
be completed over the next five years. The growth of large manufacturers significantly increases 
the electricity requirements for the area. Eskom could meet the expansion of the Namakwasands 
Plant with current capacity. The fully operational SSP will, however require a major extension of 
existing capacity. The construction of new lines from Koeberg to Aurora, building two new 
transformers at Aurora and the three feed lines to Saldanha Steel are currently underway. The 
building of further transformers and a substation are in the planning stage and Eskom believes 
they are in line with anticipated growth in the area and the needs of industry, agriculture and 
households will be met. (WCII Workshop- Mr Gopal: Eskom, 1997) 
Roads in the area are generally good. The R27 and also the N7 link the main industrial area of 
Saldanha-Vredenburg to Cape Town. 
Together with the road network the PORT and RAIL network make the West Coast and 
particularly the Saldanha-Vredenburg a SDI prospect. The Sishen Saldanha line connects the 
port to the iron ore mine, and is obviously central to the choice behind this area as site for the 
steel mill. A complete discussion of the reasons for selecting Saldanha Bay as the site of the steel 
mill is given in Chapter 3. Saldanha Bay is South Africa's largest natural harbour and has been 
used mainly as a bulk export port for iron ore. By the end of 1998, three general cargo quays will 
be completed, but currently the harbour is suited to bulk handling. Small boat and fishing 






























Cape Town International airport is the nearest international airport. Use of the Langebaanweg 
military airport is under discussion and the dual use of the airport for military and commercial 
seems viable (15 km from Saldanha). 
Industry in the area is focused around Saldanha and Vredenburg and consisted mainly of 
processing marine and agricultural products from the area as well as some small import 
replacement manufacturing further south in Atlantis. The Namakwa Sands project in 1990 
marked a change in the nature of industrial activity in the area. This Anglo American processing 
plant which produces titanium slag and pig iron together with other mineral deposits for export, 
was the first large industrial manufacturer. 11 The implementation of the Saldanha Steel Project 
(the joint venture between Iscor and the IDC) and the identification of the West Coast as a SDI is 
the beginning of new industrial plans for the region. 
Conducted surveys among industrialists on the perceived advantages of locating in the area give 
some indication of the West Coasts strengths as a SDI project (Taylor et al 1997). 12 
• a stable workforce 
• located near raw materials (especially food product sector) 
• available industrial buildings 
• near a major harbour 
• good climate 
• relatively cheap municipal services 
• good infrastructure 
• low crime and labour unrest 
• low land prices for expansion 
11 Sea Harvest was, however, involved in large scale fish product processing in Saldanha. 
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Perceived weaknesses of the area were also surveyed and they reflect some observations made 
above. Potential investors noted a shortage of skilled labour, distance from local markets, 
transport costs and lack of entertainment facilities as some disadvantages of the area. The 
following section focuses on what will be the crux of the West Coast SDI's success, the impact 















The Saldanha Steel Project 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the underlying properties of SOls is to maxumse private sector investment by 
concentrating limited state resources on the provision of hard infrastructure in areas with growth 
potential. In the West Coast Investment Initiative the Industrial Development Corporation 
collaborated with Iscor to build the Saldanha Steel Mill. The Saldanha Steel Project thus formed 
the anchor project in the regions development, and as the anchor project it is the heart and soul of 
the WCII. Although the WCII includes improving prospects in tourism, agriculture and region 
wide infrastructure - the SSP with a value of approximately R7.2 billion, extensive media 
coverage and high profile overshadows all other developments in the region. 
The construction of the mill and its location were controversial. The steel industry in the past has 
been characterised by a fight for survival internationally and Iscor's two other plants at 
Vanderbiljpark and Newcastle are consistently struggling with low international steel prices. 
Adding to this is the fact that the Saldanha location had, as mentioned earlier, a poor history of 
industrial development. These observations make it questionable whether the Steel Project would 
be successful in its own right not to mention it's ability to spur local economic activity (Fitschen, 
1997). 
Iscor and the IDC have defended the decision on the following grounds: (1) the SSP's use of new 
technology makes it viable and (2) that Saldanha Bay with its port is by far the best location in 
South Africa for such a project. 
3.2 Tecbnology 
The mini-mill at Saldanha gave Iscor the chance to keep abreast with the world trend of "thin slab 
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relatively clean technology (environmentally speaking) as well as having the ability to utilise 
locally produced lower grade coal as opposed to the imported coking coal needed in blast 
furnaces. The use of COREX technology would in fact enable the mini-mill to produce in the 
bottom quartile of world steel prices. In the unpredictable steel industry knowing that three-
quarters of the world's steel producers would be less price competitive than Saldanha, is 
reassunng. 
Two other factors may have contributed to Iscor's decision to come aboard on this project. 
Firstly, if they did not, the IDC would more than likely have attracted an international steel 
producer that would compete locally and abroad in the already competitive market. Secondly 
Iscor felt it necessary to break away from its image as a producer established in the 1930's 
upholding Apartheid principles. With new technology, new people and a radically adjusted view 
of workers in the workplace Iscor was undergoing a technical and social facelift. 
3.3 The Choice of Saldanha Bay 
In choosing the site for the mini-mill a number of locations were considered. They included the 
expansion of existing Iscor plants at either Newcastle, Pretoria and V anderbiljpark; or the 
building of a new plant at Sishen, Richards Bay, Port Elizabeth, East London or Saldanha. The 
position of the mill had to be carefully considered. First and foremost the site chosen should 
enable the mill to be competitive, secondly the site chosen should show some potential for overall 
economic growth, since the large capital investment was a joint venture with the IDC. 
The three existing mills were completely unsuitable. Pretoria has been criticised for being 
environmentally unfriendly and in the process of downsizing. The technical layout of the 
Newcastle mill and their product profile does not lend itself to the incorporation of COREX 
technology and the production of hot rolled steel. Vanderbijlpark was similarly unsuitable. 
A new site at Port Elizabeth or East London had the positive attribute of being near two well 


































the steel output, thus promoting spin-off growth from the steel investment. Unfortunately very 
high electricity prices in the region (electricity being a large cost component in the production of 
hot rolled steel) do not make these locations viable. Furthermore a distance of 14km between the 
proposed site and the port added further costs. A location near Richards Bay, near the Natal 
coalfields was also rejected. Since coal is of secondary importance visa vies iron ore, it did not 
make sense to ship ore from Saldanha (and Sishen) all the way to Richards Bay. (Fitschen 1997). 
These eliminations left Sishen and Saldanha as the main contenders. A mill at Sishen would be 
located at the source of the mined ore. The finished product could be railed to Saldanha's port on 
the rail road constructed in the seventies. Problematically, iron pellets, essential to the production 
process, needed to be imported from Brazil and would have to be railed up to Sishen along with 
coal from the port at Saldanha. The fact that electricity prices are also higher in Sishen than in 
Saldanha coupled with the point that Sishen is very undeveloped and would offer very few spin-
off growth prospects, made Saldanha look more and more like the best choice. The decline in the 
quality of the ore mined at Sishen was also a potential problem. If the quality declined to the 
point where further ore had to be imported, the positioning of the steel mill at Saldanha would 
again be the most viable. 
The infrastructure in place in the Saldanha!Vredenburg!Langebaan area was well suited to the 
large manufacturer. Good road and rail links access to a bulk-export port, low land prices and 
low electricity prices makes Saldanha attractive to large manufacturers. 
3.4 The Sustainability of Saldanha Steel 
Even in the highly competitive and volatile steel market, it appears that the Saldanha Steel mill 
itself, with its use of new technology, will be sustainable. Its location at Saldanha certainly 
enables it to k~ep certain costs low. From a national perspective the fact that the project's 
processing of raw materials adds tremendous value to exports and that it hopes to earn an 
estimated Rl.8 billion per annum in foreign exchange has good implications for the wider 
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economy. The long run sustainability of Saldanha Steel will be dependent on market demand, 
which in tum will be determined by the price and quality of Saldanha's Steel. 
The quality of the steel produced at Saldanha seems assured. The iron ore mill using CO REX 
technology produces "clean" steel which is important when buyers need the steel for the cold 
forming (e.g. metal pressing). Also Saldanha Steel will be able to produce Ultra Thin Hot rolled 
Coil that can replace more expensive cold-rolled steel of similar thickness. The quality 
advantages of Saldanha's Steel bode well for local and foreign demand. 
The price at which Saldanha Steel will be supplying the local and international markets is also 
critical to the sustainability of the plant itself. Two main factors dominate the price of steel in 
South Africa. They are the variable world price and excess capacity of world and South African 
steel producers. Excess capacity in the steel industry (a problem added to by the establishment of 
the SSP) leaves Iscor with two alternatives. Either, close down sections of production (incurring 
financial and job losses) or sell the excess production in other markets. The price at which Iscor 
sells steel for export is lower than the price it sells steel for domestically. The lower export prices 
compensate overseas buyers for longer wait times as well as the additional costs of import tariffs 
which buyers must pay. Thus the discrepancy between Iscor's local and export prices. Since 
other world steel producers are in similar predicaments, imported steel prices are also low and 
Iscor must compete with these lower import prices if they want to sell steel locally. Local 
producers will buy local steel because of certain factors: 
• Iscor provides free technical advice and service to local customers 
• Importing steel means carrying more stock to compensate for slower delivery times 
• Credit and currency cover (insurance against depreciation) mean higher implicit costs of 
imports 
Iscor claims that it will follow a market strategy that incorporates maintaining flexible prices in 
line with import parity. Local producers buying steel to process for export can do so at export 
parity. As a rule Saldanha will set prices in line with Vanderbijlpark's hot rolled prices. This 
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means that prices at the plant itself will not be much cheaper than anywhere else in the country. 
Since Saldanha will not offer significantly lower steel prices, downstream firms will locate in 
Saldanha for perhaps the following reasons: 13 
• It is near the port and thus good for downstream exporters or for transport to other South 
African ports 
• It is closer to other markets (e.g. Cape Town) than the Gauteng mill 
• Specialised product of Saldanha Steel (limited) 
• Producer may simply want to live in Saldanha/Vredenburg/Langebaan (SVL) area. 
Overall the quality and price factors of the new mill seem to point to it being the most sustainable 
steel mill in South Africa. The mill's position at a suitable port with good access to its raw 
material needs suggests Saldanha is an economically efficient locational choice. 
The Saladanha Steel project must not, however, be judged only as a stand-alone success or 
failure. We must remember that it is the "anchor project" in the wider context of the West Coast 
Investment Initiative. The IDC has made a large investment (approximately half the total) and it 
is looking to the SSP to be the catalyst of sustainable economic growth in the region. If the SSP 
is to be an unqualified success it has to lead to the achievement of the SDI goals. 
13 The incentive for downstream development are essential to achieving the goals of the SDI as noted previously. 
Essentially it means that producers will locate in the SVL region not just because of the SSP's prices (which will be 
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Two stated objectives of SDis are the generation of sustainable growth in localities with inherent 
economic potential and the creation of sustainable employment for the local inhabitants of the 
chosen area. For these objectives to be achieved the theory outlined in Chapter 1 draws attention 
to two fundamental attributes of successful regional programs. 
• Key infrastructural or capital projects must be carefully chosen and reflect market demand for 
such projects. 
• The development of the project must build social capital or economic capacity in the region. 
The study focuses on the second of these attributes. 
Lewis and Bloch (1997) state that due to the Saldanha region's weak industrial capacity and the 
nature of the Saldanha steel mill - in particular the characteristics of its inputs and outputs - it is 
unlikely that the construction of the mill will comprehensively alter the industrial capacity of the 
region. They do mention, however, that the impact of the large-scale capital investment (approx. 
R7.2 billion) should not be underestimated. 
It is clear, for the goals of the SDI to be achieved, the exogenous investment of 7.2 billion should 
be conscientiously channeled toward local firms and households. The study examines whether 
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Has the SSP as the anchor project of the West Coast Investment Initiative resulted in any 
characteristic "side effects" as identified by Kyu Sik Lee?14 Has the Procurement Policy and the 
manner in which SSP have dealt with local firms assisted in increasing "social capital" in the 
region? In order to evaluate the economic impact of the SSP on the region, a survey of firms in 
the Saldanha-Vredenburg-Langebaan area (SVL) was conducted. 
4.2 The Koals of the survey 
By judging the reaction of business during the construction phase ofthe project it was hoped that 
potential future growth could be estimated. That growth would be based on whether local firms 
believe that the SSP and large on-site contractors had acted in a way consistent with uplifting 
local business15 and how the local firms changed or altered their behaviour since the arrival of the 
SSP. The question of whether the local upliftment and growth is sustainable underlies both the 
above ideas. Anchor projects are judged by their influence on the area's growth capacity. By 
looking at local firms as some representation of local prospects in general, is it likely that the SSP 
has made an impact on economic activity that can be sustained? 
4.3 DefininK the population 
As with any sample there is a balancing act between complete thoroughness and practicality. The 
population is defined as the complete list of firms from which a sample would be randomly 
chosen. In attempting to establish a population from which to draw a sample, two populations 
were initially identified. 
a) The entire list of all registered firms in the SVL region (as identified by local municipality 
registration) and 
b) The list of local firms who had actually supplied or had done business with SSP (as identified 
by invoice records from SSP and major contractors). 
14 Kyu Sik Lee (1996: 23-26) quoted in Chapter 1. 
u The commibnent to local business is clearly laid down in the SSP Procurement Policy. 
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Neither of these populations seemed suitable. It was likely that because of the diverse nature of 
the firms on the first list that even if a large sample was drawn from this list, it was probable that 
very few firms would have done significant business with SSP. Since many questions in the 
survey were about the actual business practices of SSP and major contractors, a large proportion 
of replies from firms with no direct dealing with SSP would not address the aims of the survey. 
The second population did not present the same difficulties. The population was ~maHer, they 
were contractable and the list was up to date. All firms on the list had also obviously supplied 
SSP and/or major on-site contractors and so any sample would have relevant comment. Since, 
however, the survey was evaluating the SSP's impact on local firms and analysing the affects of 
procurement policy, this population seemed severely biased. It was biased because it excluded all 
firms who, for whatever reason, had not done business with SSP or contractors even though they 
might have wanted to. For these reasons the two initially proposed populations were rejected. 
A third listing of local suppliers as compiled by Project Services at Saldanha Steel was judged 
most representative of the population from which to sample. Prior to the commencement of the 
construction phase of Saldanha Steel, information meetings were held in towns in the SVL area. 
These community forums, as they were known, provided information about many aspects of the 
Project, including general information about the kinds of materials, goods and services that would 
be required during the project. Local businesses, which believed they could offer any service to 
the SSP at any stage, submitted their names and their various lines of service to the SSP 
procurement officials. Including all submissions, The Project Services Team at Saldanha Steel 
compiled a supplier's list from all submissions. The suppliers on the list all operated in the so-
called "Area 1 ". SSP Procurement Policy stipulated the awarding of contracts in part according 
to geographical preference. Preference Area 1 was the local SVL area (within 60km of the SSP). 
Preference Area 2 incorporated the Western Cape, and Preference Area 3 included the rest of 
South Africa. The list was to be used by SSP and all contractors and sub-contractors to ensure 






























Drawing the sample from this list ensured representivity. The list was compiled by SSP, there 
were no conditions for getting onto the list except that the firm had to be local and that the firms 
believed that they had some goods or service that may be required at some stage. Appearing on 
the list involved little effort and simply meant a firm had to notify SSP of its presence. The 
existence of the supplier•s list was well known and the community meetings were highly 
publicised. 
4.4 Drawin~ a sample from the Sup.plier•s List. 
Stoodely et al (1980) state that it is important to select a sample that adequately represents both 
the population and the characteristics under examination. 
The goal of the survey was to evaluate the impact that the SSP had on local firms. It seemed 
probable that the SSP would impact differently on different sectors amongst local firms, that is, 
for example, the business from the SSP may have been excellent for engineers and yet poor for 
retailers. To ensure that the results from the survey would reflect these differences the initial 
supply list was divided into sectoral categories and the number of firms in each category was 



















Table 1: Supply List Categories16 
No~ of Sample 
firms Drawn 
1. Accommodation, Hotels, Restaurants and Caterers 20 ' 3 
2. Building, construction, plant construction. 47 7 
3. Engineering Supplies/Equipment and service 48 8 ' 
4. Electrical systems and Plant maintenance and Operations 37 6 
5. Waste removal, Laundry, Gardening and Sanitation 37 6 
6. Motoring, Transport and Fuel 20 3 
7. Professional Services (Accounts, agents, planners etc.) 28 4 
' 8. Retail and Service (Shops, Hardware, Pharmacies etc.) 50 9 
I 
I 
9. Office supplies and refurbishment 24 4 
TOTAL 311 50 
: 
A sample of 50 firms was drawn from the list of 311 businesses. To ensure that a representative 
proportion of each sector/category was selected the percentage of each category drawn in the 
sample equalled the percentage each category represented on the full list (311 ). 20 out of 311 
were Group 1 firms representing 6.4 % of the total and therefore 3 businesses from Group 1 were 
included in the sample. 
In total 50 firms were randomly chosen from the suppliers list. 31 full replies were obtained. 
Five ofthe selected firms refused to be interviewed or said that they did not have the time. Four 
firms had either closed down or stopped operating, this information was discovered during an 
.interview with a local estate agent. The agency had been renting premises to these firms and 
knew that they had stopped operating in the area. Finally, ten firms could not be contacted. 
16 Category 2, 3 and 4 are all involved directly in plant construction and were separated to show more clearly the 
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Repeated telephone calls and visits to stated addresses were unsuccessful, but it is not known 
whether or not these firms still operate in the area. 
4.5 The method of Survey 
The questionnaire used in the survey is included as Appendix A. To ensure that all interviewees 
answered the questions in similar situations and that different interpretations of the questions 
were avoided, all interviews were conducted by myself. Conducting all the interviews in person 
had the added advantage of me being able to see the premises. As the only interviewer I believe I 
was able to maintain consistency especially with regard to the tone, manner and nature of answers 
to the questions that required comment. Apart from answering the questions on the 
questionnaire, I encouraged any comments about their business, the town or the SSP. 
Interviewees were informed that I did not work for Saldanha Steel and that the survey was part of 
an independent report for the Industrial Strategy Project (ISP), on the impact that the Saldanha 
Steel Investment was having on local firms. All interviewees were made aware of how they had 
been selected for the survey. 
4.6 Survey Questionnaire 
The Survey questioned vanous aspects of local firm's dealings with SSP and the maJor 
contractors. The interview collected data on: 
1. Information about the firm and its existence in the SVL area; 
2. The impact that SSP had on firms- turnover, employment, growth etc; 
3. The impact that the SSP had on market conditions in their field e.g. competition, prices etc; 
4. Questions as to whether the business environment had altered since the arrival of the project; 
5. Questions about product, process and service adjustments since the arrival of the SSP 
6. The question of tendering and quoting on SSP contracts; 
7. Perceptions, comments and experiences with SSP and major on site contractors and 
8. The finn's expectations and future prospects in the area. 
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4. 7 The Results from the Survey 
4. 7.1 Back~ound of fions 
The surveyed businesses had operated in the area for on average just over 13 years. Twelve fions 
had been in the area for twenty or more years. Three fions had been established more than 30 
years ago. Six fions had been in business for less than two years. Of these six fions, three said 
that they had moved to the area because of the Saldanha Steel Project.17 One was a new building 
company and the other two were new branches of national fions. 18 
The large number of long established fions added an interesting angle to the survey. During 
discussions, many of the interviewed people could reflect on the large capital projects embarked 
upon previously in the West Coast area, and how these projects compared to the SSP. One case 
in particular was rather ironic. A general manager at a construction supply company with 
national links was originally transferred to Vredenburg because of the proposed steel mill that 
was to accompany the Sishen railway line. The businessman said, "I have been waiting literally 
twenty years for this project!" 
4. 7.2 Business activity and the Affect of SSP on Business Practice. Goods and Services 
It seemed probable that the SSP would cause both increased competition and increased business 
activity in the area. Certain survey questions investigated fions' reactions to these changes. 
In Question three fions were asked if the influx of new fions into the SVL area had added to 
competition in their line of business. 16 fions said that competition in their field had increased. 
Of these, nine said that they had reacted to this competition in some way. The nine fions who 
said that they had reacted to the influx of competition were asked to explain how they reacted. 
17 Firms had to be officially established in the SVL region to be allowed on the SS Suppliers list. 
11 An industrial air company and car rental company moved to Saldanha at the very early stages of the SSP. Their 
managers attended community meetings and got on the list as local firms, which they were entitled to do. 
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Table 2: Reaction to Increased Competition 
Number or firms that altered tl1ejr pnces only 5 
Number of:fll"ttls that altered their products and/or services only 1 
Number of firms that increased their stock levels only 1 
Number of firms that altered prices and increased stock 1 




Giving further consideration to product and services, firms were asked if they improved any of 
their products and services specifically to meet SSP standards or acquire contracts. Nine out of 
31 firms said that they had improved their product and service. The comments from these nine 
firms suggested they improved mainly the speed and efficiency of their service. Interestingly in 
cross-question analysis, seven of these nine firms had stated that there was increased competition 
in their field (Question three) and six of these seven had made other adjustments to be more 
competitive. Since the arrival of the SSP increased competition prompted greater efficiency and 
price adjustments from local firms. 
In Question five firms were asked if their turnover, number of employees, amount of capital 
equipment, service support equipment or premises had changed since the arrival of the SSP. 
Table 3: Changes in capital, labour, turnover and premises 
lncr a ed Deer:eased Unchanged 
Turnover 21 0 10 
I 
Number of Employees 16 0 15 
Ca:pilal eqmpmenl 6 0 25 
Service Support 9 0 22 
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A large portion of sampled firms (21 of 31) stated that turnover had increased since the arrival of 
the SSP. This was hardly surprising considering the project costs amounted to R 7.2 billion and 
employed more than 5000 people during the construction phase. Fewer firms increased their 
number of employees and other indications of permanent physical expansion were not prominent. 
The arrival of the SSP in the SVL area marks a significant change in the industrial character of 
the region. For local firms to be successful they would have to cope with the demands of the 
massive construction project or they would lose out to firms based in larger centres like Cape 
Town. Firms were asked in Question 18 if they had adjusted their range of products and services 
to deal with the needs of the SSP. The survey asked if firms had (1) expanded the range of 
products and services they were providing (2) diversified into new products and services (3) 
specialised in certain products or services (4) increased their general stock levels. Firms answered 
as is shown in the table below: 
Table 4: Firm's adjustments to deal with SSP 
Number of firms which expanded product range or services 6 
Number of firms which.diversified products and services 8 
Number of firms which began to specialise 5 
Number of firms which increased general stock19 7 
Table 4 showed adjustments firms had made to products, services and stock during the 
construction of the SSP. Question 19 asked if any of these changes were permanent (i.e. seen as 
continuing after the construction phase). 22 out of 31 firms had claimed to have made at least 
one adjustment. 
19 22 of 31 firms replied that they had made at least one adjustment. 
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TableS: Sustainable Adjustments 
i~ ...... No.otftrms 
~··· - .. .'':·. 
Adjustments were seen as permanent 10 
Adjustments were seen as temporary 8 
Were not sure if they were permanent 4 
The result showed a fair proportion of local firms willing and able to adapt to the new demands of 
the changing local economy. Three of the five firms that specialised said that they had 
specialised so as to improve their supply of goods and services needed in large construction 
projects. The changes will enable firms to cope with the construction of the proposed Duferco 
and PPC plants. Significantly, two of these three are firms with national links or are branches of 
nationally based finns. 
The success of firms with national links/branches or franchise links was notable. Irrespective of 
the category, local firms with national links (i.e. branches or franchises) had generally been very 
successful since the arrival of the SSP. Eight of the 31 firms were of this type. All eight had 
increased turnover in the period. Six out of eight had increased the number of employees. 
The results of the survey point to firms with national links adapting more easily to the kind of 
business conditions that arise from a large capital intensive project like Saldanha Steel. 
Discussions in the interviews shed some light on why these firms may have advantages in the 
area. Firms with national links appear to have an advantage over other local firms for the 
following reasons: 
a) Such firms have national depots and can meet the huge quantities and short delivery times 
often required by projects like SSP. A material supply finn, for example was able to draw on 
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b) Nationally based finns have pre-existing contact with major contractors throughout the 
country. Major contractors operate nationally and do business with many other nationally 
based firms. If these firms have branches in the SVL area this obviously has tremendous 
advantages when it comes to acquiring contracts. 
c) This type of firm could invariably draw on national experience with large contracts. For 
example, one industrial air supplier's branch in Saldanha was staffed by employees who had 
previously worked for the Mosgas project. 
d) Additional staff and expertise could be temporarily shifted from other branches. To cope with 
the sudden boom in business a car rental company transferred an employee from a Cape Town 
operation. Staff training is also less of a problem, the company above said that they trained 
new employees at large branches all over the country and drawing on these new employees 
was not difficult. 
e) Access to financial capital, if needed for expansion, was not listed as a problem for any of the 
national firms, whereas for other business's surveyed it was the most commonly mentioned 
growth inhibiting factor. 
f) In most cases, if local firms wished to take advantage of the boom created by the SSP they 
needed to expand. There is great risk attached to such expansion, especially since the end of 
the construction phase is likely to cause business to slow down. For nationally based finns the 
cost of down-scaling after the massive construction phase is less. Employees can transfer 
back, unused stock can be returned to national depots and capital equipment can be absorbed. 
Firms without national links cannot expand and shrink so easily. The risk of expanding is 
higher and so many of these firms cannot take full advantage of short term booms or are at 
least reluctant to do so. 
When assessing the impact that a large-scale investment like the SSP will have on a local 
economy, policy makers should note the advantage nationally based firms have. These firms 
possess certain characteristics, which support their success. 
If SDI projects wish to assist local firms in best using the opportunities afforded by large anchor 
projects then the success of nationally based firms provide some guidelines. Assisting local firms 
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in mimicking the advantages nationally based firms have, is a good place to start. Provision of 
access to capital for expansion is important. Having experience in dealing with large projects is 
an advantage, so attempting to provide advice for local firms on how to handle large projects 
could be looked at. 
4. 7.3 Saldanha Steel's Procurement Policy and the Tender Process 
As has been explained Saldanha Steel has committed itself to making maximum use of local 
labour and other resources. It was also clear that major on-site contractors were required to do 
the same (SSP Procurement, 1996). It was hoped the SSP's arrival would spark growth and 
competitive improvements in local firms. For its part, Saldanha Steel's procurement policy 
should have helped maximise the positive spin-off effects of the large investment. Furthermore 
assessing the impact of SSP's procurement policy on firms, lessons could be learned and applied 
to anchor project investments in future. It was also hoped that tender and quoting procedures 
would be clear, uncomplicated and also reflect SSP's commitment to local suppliers. 
The perception of the local firms of the procurement process at Saldanha Steel was examined by 
asking eight questions about the tender and/or quoting procedures of SSP and major on site 
contractors. Suppliers were asked if they had tendered or quoted on any SSP contracts and 
whether they had been successful in their bid. 
There were two ways to get a contract at Saldanha Steel. Firstly, official sealed bid tendering 
took place for any contracts above R50 000. This process required that a contract is advertised by 
SSP or major on-site contractor and those interested firms submit their tender. All tenders should 
be considered, one chosen and the rest receive some feedback as to why their tender was 
unsuccessful. 
For contracts less than R50 000 a normal quotation practice applied. SSP would contact a 
number of suppliers off the supplier's list and ask them to quote on a contract. The "best" quote 
acquired would be awarded the contract. The sample answered as follows: 
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Table 6: Quotations 
Number of firms who quoted on contracts 19 61% 
Number of firms who quoted successfully at least once20 18 58% 
Table 7: Tenders 
Number of firms who tendered21 10 32% 
Number of firms who succeeded in any tender bid 7 23% 
Question 11 established that five firms who at some stage were unsuccessful with official tenders 
claimed they received no feedback as to why they had failed. The lack of feedback created 
uncertainty for local firms. 
When firms were asked in Question 16, if they had complaints about the tender or quoting 
procedures at Saldanha Steel, eight firms replied in the positive. Some firms saw the process as 
too informal and creating feelings of unfairness. Some firms believed contractors bought from 
outside the SVL area without asking for quotes from local business. 
In an attempt to ascertain how local firms stood competitively the survey asked if they knew why 
they did not get a contract they sought. Question 13 asked whether the lack of success was 
attributed to price, quality, quantity, delivery time or any other reason. Four firms believed they 
lost contracts because their prices were too high, but they did not know for certain, as they had 
not received feedback from SSP or major contractors. No firms believed they did not get 
contracts because of inferior quality goods, and quantity as well as delivery time did not feature 
strongly as a reason for lost contracts. 
20 Some fmns quoted on a number of contracts, some were both successful and unsuccessful. If fmns quoted 
successfully at any stage they were listed. 
21 Some fmns won and lost tenders, even if they only won one tender they are listed as successful 
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The belief that contracts were lost for reasons other than those above came out quite strongly. 
Six firms believed that Cape Town and Johannesburg firms got contracts because of links with 
lscor and/or contractors elsewhere in the country - these feelings were fuelled by the lack of 
feedback to unsuccessful tenders. A number of local firms that believed they quoted very 
competitively on contracts lost out to Cape town firms with no explanation. This induced 
feelings of scepticism about the handling of some contracts. 
The tender process seemed to be completely understood since none of the 31 firms said they had 
learned anything new about the actual tender process (Question 17). Eight firms said they had 
learnt about their competitive position in the market, realising that they had to improve their 
service or lower their prices. Small local firms get exposed to nation competition and with a bit 
of support from a liberal procurement policy, they can hopefully step up and meet the challenge 
and simultaneously improve the economic prospects in the area. 
4.7.3.1 Conclusions on Procurement, Tenders and Quoting at SSP 
With regards to tendering and quoting the survey questionnaire addressed the fairness and 
effectiveness of the tender/quoting system used as well as the behaviour of the SSP and major 
contractors in the tender /quote process. The results point to both strengths and weaknesses in the 
way Saldanha Steel and major contractors handled tendering procedures. 
a) Formal Tendering and Quoting 
A number of firms suggested that the quoting and tendering system should be more formal and 
more rigorous. No firms said that they did not understand the tendering process or that it was too 
complicated. It was clear that the more formalised the tendering and feedback procedure was, the 
greater the feeling of fairness would be. On the positive side most firms believed that the SSP 
had co-operated better with local firms than previous large capital projects, notably the harbour 
expansion and Namakwa Sands. 
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b) Community forums were useful but not sufficient. 
Decentralisation policy as conducted by the previous government was far from an interactive 
process. Massive capital projects were centrally decided upon with little to no local involvement. 
The people of the SVL area can attest to this and many did mention this point during the survey. 
One interviewee stated that he had been in Saldanha for thirty years and seen the development of 
the Sishen railway line, the harbour, the military academy and recently the Namakwa Sands 
project. He said, "There was more consultation with the local community on the SSP than all the 
other developments put together". 
The community was involved right from the beginning as the environmental debate over the 
project raged and the SSP followed this up with community meetings. These meetings were very 
useful and awareness of various aspects of the project was raised. A number of interviewees said, 
however, that these meetings were not totally sufficient and the needs of local firms could have 
been still better served. SSP and major contractors could have held meetings/forums where the 
topics discussed were more industry specific, i.e. separate meetings for say heavy construction, 
financial services, plant maintenance etc. The impression received was that the community 
forums were useful in providing initial details about the project, but that the large number of 
topics under discussion meant that information was not as thorough as it could have been. Local 
firms could have explained what they were capable of doing and could have prepared specifically 
to meet the needs of SSP. This practice could have been repeated at various industry specific 
meetings, but was obviously not possible to do at every community forum. The point seemed 
valid since the forums had to deal with social problems, labour disputes as well as all significant 
tendering/quoting opportunities. This left the perception that the meetings were disorganised. 
Industry specific meetings held fairly regularly appear to be a good idea and considering Iscor 































c) Tender Feedback 
The lack of and inconsistency of tender and quote feedback is a major cause of distress. This 
comment was common in connection with Saldanha Steel and its major contractors. Infonnation 
about the reasons for unsuccessful tenders or quotes are essential especially for local business 
who at first may not fully appreciate their competitive position in relation to outside finns. Local 
finns need feedback with respect to price, quality, delivery times and general service levels, 
because if their quote/tender is unsuccessful local finns need to know how much to improve 
prices or service etc. Lack of feedback makes future quoting difficult and as a result locals 
believe outsiders get future contracts. Worse still, a lack of feedback may result in local finns 
not submitting further tenders or quotes. 
The lack of feedback also adds to local suspicion and discontent. A number of surveyed finns 
believe that their quotes were not given a fair chance. Two small engineering finns, an alarm 
company and a computer finn were amongst those that received no feedback on quotes that they 
had put forward. Fuelling their discontent was the fact that they later learned they had lost out to 
Cape Town based companies. If SSP and major contractors provided adequate feedback 
explaining why finns had been unsuccessful, this could have removed suspicions of unfair 
treatment. In a small community perception is very important. The perception that local finns 
are being unfairly treated by SSP could mean, less support for industrial projects in future. Part 
of developing "social capital" is the construction of a community, which works together, supports 
and learns to deal with industrial projects. 
Once again a large benefit can be given to local finns by the introduction of simple and consistent 
practice. After all SSP does have to consider all their tenders and quotes to make sure it gets the 
best prices, so consistent feedback to these finns seems easily plausible. Local finns should be 
given every opportunity to take advantage of the initial capital investment. Successful regional 
policy relies on the region improving its capacity for economic development and for the emerging 
regional economy to attract further investment. An easily rectifiable problem such as inconsistent 
tender feedback could jeopardise this success. 
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d) Entry onto the SSP site 
A problem specific to the Saldanha Steel Project seemed to be the difficulty of getting on to the 
site. Once a contract was secured and a firm gained access to the construction site they gained 
the inside track to any further contracts. The necessarily tight security on site led to a distinct 
insider-outsider situation. Some local firms believed this hindered their chances of doing work 
since they could not get on to the site to see what contractors needed or what work could be 
contracted for. Only after a number of months of construction did a local toilet hire company get 
access to the construction site. When they did they found other sanitation contracts which they 
had not got a chance to quote on in the past. Once on site they found they could better a Cape 
Town based firm's prices and thus secured further contracts. This situation could be rectified by 
regular, industry specific meetings about what exactly is going on and what is needed on the site. 
e) Procurement Policy Issues 
The Procurement Policy at Saldanha Steel states: 
• Preference to local labour, suppliers and services 
• Meaningful involvement of Sabtaco22 
• Inclusion of emerging contractors on non-critical elements of the project. 
Local firms were preferred but with no cost, quality or delivery-time concessions. Perhaps the 
policy could have done more to promote local firms. The Department of Public Works, The 
Department of Trade and Industry and the State Tender Board have been working since 1995 on 
Public Sector Procurement reform.23 The goal of these reforms is to promote smaller firms and 
previously disadvantaged groups. A system has been adopted where tenders will be awarded on 
point systems where price and product form part of a formula that incorporates preferential 
targeting of selected groups. 
22 Sabtaco- South African Black Technical and Allied Careers Organisation 
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Unlike the SSP Procurement policy the aforementioned system could allow a local firm to win a 
tender even if they were slightly more expensive. Local firms would have benefited more from 
the SSP. One can argue about the efficiency of preferential targeting, but if the state tender board 
can adopt such measures surely a joint venture between the IDC and Iscor should also. 
In the interviews some firms said that they believed the procurement policy was not adhered to. 
For example, an official franchise motor dealership quoted on new cars for SSP officials. The 
dealer offers nationally standardised prices for particular car models. Days later he saw SSP 
employees driving new cars of his model purchased in Johannesburg at what could only be 
standardised prices. He saw this as a breech of the procurement policy. Saldanha Steel also used 
a Cape Town courier service when more than one local courier would meet any price and offered 
the same services, once again an apparent breech of the procurement policy. 
4.7.4 Sustainable Growth and Barriers to expansion 
Questioning the sustainable nature of the interaction between local firms and the steel mill, firms 
were asked in Question 9 if they supplied a product or service that would be required by Saldanha 
Steel in the operational phase, that is, the normal operation of the mill after construction. 
25 of the 31 firms surveyed said they supplied goods and services that would be required for 
production at the mill after the construction phase. Four firms said they did not supply products 
and services that would be required by the SSP after the construction phase and a further two said 
that they were uncertain. These results can certainly be viewed in a positive light since it appears 
that the SSP will potentially still be providing opportunities to local firms when the construction 
phase is over. 
A number of questions were asked in an attempt to uncover the perceptions of local firms about 
the prospects for growth in the area and how these prospects had been affected by the SSP. 
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The questions were as follows: 
Question 4: What affect has the SSP had on your business prospects in the region? 
Question 22: Have your expectations of Saldanha Steel's impact on growth in the area been 
fulfilled? The answers were generally very positive: 
26 firms said that the SSP had improved their business prospects in the area. Three firms said 
that their business prospects were harmed. The reason they gave was that they were struggling to 
compete with new firms who had arrived because of the project. 
16 firms said that their expectations of the SSP's impact on growth had been fulfilled. Seven 
firms said that their expectations were fulfilled to some extent. 
Some firms had thought there would be more work for local firms when the SSP was originally 
announced and others were disillusioned by the fact that Cape Town based firms got many of the 
contracts. In these respects some firms felt their expectations were not fulfilled. 
Question 21 asked what firms perceived as the factors limiting their business growth in the 
region. The firms are given a choice of some possible factors and asked if any there are other 
factors they could think of: 
Table 8: Possible factors limiti g a firm's growth in the SVL 
F d.or Limiting Growth Yes No 
Size ofSVL area 10 21 
Distance from major centers 1 20 
Lack of skilled labour 5 26 
L:ack of financ ial capital 9 22 
Other 6 25 
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Among the "other" limits to expansion was the increasing competition from Cape Town firms 
and the lack of appropriate housing especially for higher wage earners. Generally the firms were 
very positive about the business prospects in the region and many stated that the SSP had done 
more for local business than any other major projects. 
Lack of financial capital was the most stated reason. Underlining the importance of access to 
capital is the already mentioned success of the nationally based firms who almost always have 
access to capital and are able to fulfill growth potential (Section 4. 7.2). Being able to finance the 
major anchor projects of regional policies is often the focus of government attention. The ability 
of local firms to finance their own expansion in response to such anchor projects should also be 
considered a priority. Again, international experience reminds regional policy makers of the 
importance of a large initial investment in sparking-off local industry. Small local firms may not 
have access to short term profits to fuel their expansion and high interest rates and volatility make 
large loans extremely risky. 
The lack of skilled labour was not commonly mentioned, but significantly three engineering 
firms, an accounting finn and an estate agent listed this reason. The attraction of skilled persons 
to the West Coast area does appear to be a problem as the level of skill required increases. This 
problem was picked up in the profile of the area, largely low levels of skilled labour and an 
exodus of educated young people were noted in the population profile. 
The reason for this may be exasperated by property prices in the area. Both estate agents noted 
the housing situation in Vredenburg/Saldanha as a problem. They said that many potential 
employees were being interviewed in the area and at the same time were looking at prospective 
accommodation. The agents spoken to said they already knew of a few people who were happy 
with potential work opportunity, but the high cost and relatively very low value for money in 
accommodation especially compared to the Gauteng area, made the move to the West Coast 




























rectify this problem, but from what agents say, building costs are also extremely high because of 
the already extended local construction sector.24 
The shortage of low cost housing which the area shares with South Africa as a whole, coupled 
with insufficient residence for higher-skilled and higher paid employees in the area, makes the 
housing situation in the area one of the least documented, but potentially more serious problems. 
For regional intervention to be sustainable the chosen area must endogenise the growth process. 
That is the area should develop the ability to attract new investment and continue to do so after 
the original investment. Improvements in the areas industrial capacity will have to be backed up 
by suitable housing for all income groups if the area wishes to continue to attract new investment. 
Despite the problems mentioned, firms' comments were positive about their prospects in the area, 
especially those firms with national links. An industrial air firm, a national car rental firm, and a 
communications firm all saw the need for expansion in the near future. Most of these firms are 
service or support firms. They rely on the growth of larger manufacturers who in turn use their 
services. The ability of local firms to support larger manufacturers has improved. Firms also saw 
their distance from other major centres like Cape Town as an advantage rather than factor 
limiting growth. 
24 Similar to a case of Dutch Disease where a boom in economic investment pushes up construction and input prices 
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Conclusions and Policy Implications 
5.1 Indications of Sustainable Growth 
International experience points to an improvement in "social capital" being an essential ingredient 
for successful regional development. If the SSP is to be a successful anchor project then it would 
have to impact on the area's economic capacity and the region should show signs of improved 
social capital. 
An improvement of the region's capacity would be realised if ( 1) existing firms expanded to 
become more productive and competitive and/or (2) if new firms established themselves in the 
area permanently. Both developments would be an investment in the area's economic potential, 
above and beyond the production of steel for export. If at all possible in this SDI, local resources 
must be boosted. The procurement policy initiated by the SSP had a specific role to play. It 
should have facilitated the large investment's filtration into the local economy to as greater extent 
as possible. Contracts awarded to firms from areas outside the demarcated development area do 
not necessarily forward the goals of the SDI process. 
5.2 The Growth of Local Firms 
In Chapter 4 we outlined the success and the failures that the SSP has had in its attempt to 
support local firms. Results from the survey suggest that local firms have made significant 
changes in order to meet increased business opportunities. 
Many firms adjusted prices to be competitive in relation to "outside firms". The large scale of the 
SSP made it necessary for local firms to compete with other firms based in larger economic 
centres like Cape Town and in Gauteng. More competitive pricing and general improvement in 

























Finns gained experience and new skills working on large capital projects and there was some 
degree of expansion of services and products associated with large industrial projects. There was 
also evidence that some firms improved their ability to supply larger quantities in shorter periods. 
Upstream or supply-side firms have made these improvements which can be seen as the "side 
effects" of a successful anchor project. The firms are generally support or service firms providing 
products and services to the SSP. These improvements bode well not only for the growth 
prospects of the firms themselves, but also for the prospects of attracting further industrial 
development. The ability of local firms to cater for the needs of larger industries has been greatly 
improved. The new effectiveness of local firms adds to the West Coast's good infrastructure and 
can be seen as an improvement in social capital. This is to some degree a realisation of one of the 
SDI goals. That is, for the area in question to endogenise the process of attracting new 
investment. 
Besides the local firms that were on the SSP supplier's list other new firms (especially those 
concerned with the construction and maintenance of large industries) have moved into the area. 
The accessibility and competitiveness of services is an additional pull for the large manufacturers 
who might link backwards or forwards wi h Saldanha Steel. The arrival of new firms also 
improves the area's capacity for economic action. 
The announcement of a number of downstream developments had further improved growth 
prospects in the region. Duferco, a Swiss company, in another joint venture with the IDC, is 
establishing a cold rolling facility. This represents the first forward linkage with the Saldanha 
Steel Project. The cold rolled steel facility will use SSP's product for further refinement. The 
construction of the Duferco plant will also help maintain a degree of business momentum that 
will inevitably slow somewhat with the completion of the SSP construction. 
Pretoria Portland Cement (PPC) has also announced its intention of establishing a Rl50 million 



























with SSP. Slag waste from SSP will be used in the production of cement and PPC will also 
process some limestone and dolomite for use by the steel mill. 
5.3 SSP Procurement Policy 
Evidence from local business suggests that the SSP's procurement policy did play a role in the 
improvements made by local firms. Certainly without the policy stipulating local preference, 
many more contracts would have been given to firms outside the SVL area. Local firms could, 
however, have been given additional assistance. Access to capital was a problem for many firms, 
in a time when expanding their operations seemed feasible. Confusion over tender feedback may 
have inhibited the ability of some local firms to grow just when the SSP should have been having 
its largest impact. The survey results suggested that the more formal and explicit tendering and 
quoting procedures were, the greater the perception of fairness would be. Adhering rigidly to 
tender feedback procedures would also reduce uncertainty and allow local firms to adapt more 
quickly to increased competition. 
If the government intends to initiate large anch r projects in future to boost underdeveloped 
regions, the firms in the chosen area must be given every chance to expand during the 
construction of such projects. Rigidly defined procurement policies supporting local firms and 
assisting these firms in acquiring capital for expansion must feature in the plans for any regional 
intervention. Nationally based firms with multiple franchises or branches are able to expand and 
contract their regional operations easily; they are thus well equipped to deal with large, short-term 
projects. 
Long-term supply contracts could be reviewed occasionally so those firms with unsuccessful 
tenders can attempt to meet outside prices and services. Naturally it is beneficial for the SSP to 
contract certain companies for the duration of the project. Established relationships save time, 
money and effort. However, one of the important goals of a SDI program and consequently any 
anchor project, is to improve the capacity of local firms. Initially local firms may be 
uncompetitive in relation to city based firms and may lose contacts. If these contacts could be 
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reviewed at certain periods it might give local firms the chance to make competitive adjustments 
and acquire contracts. Local firms will in this sense have been given time to learn about their 
competitive position in their field and advance themselves. It must be remembered that a 
competitive and efficient community of local firms will be an incentive for future investment in 
the area. 
A lesson for future large capital projects is perhaps that procurement policies supporting local 
firms are a necessary, but not sufficient accompaniment to such projects. Local firms could 
benefit from further support. As much information as possible should be provided to local firms 
about possible contracts and tender and quote feedback. Past regional policies warn against 
incentive or subsidy-based approaches, but policy makers must find a way to help firms acquire 
capital for expansion. 
5.4 Max;imisin~ Government Policy Effects 
The establishment of the SSP impacted on the West Coast Region and the R7,2 billion 
investment has improved the economic capacity of the area. To ensure Government policy has a 
wider impact we also need to transfer knowledge acquired in one region's development to 
another. Learning from the SSP experience could improve the impact of Government finance on 
regional development in future. The study undertaken has highlighted issues, especially with 
regards to large capital investments, which could be addressed to ensure that sustainable 



















1. Arkwright D.J. and de Beer. The Application of Spatial Development Initiatives in South 
Africa. Presentation to the USA Southern African Economic Officers: Sun City, 7 October 
1996. 
2. Bloch, R. Post-War Regional Planning Theory and Record. In The South African Journal 
ofEconomics 58.2.1990. 
3. Driver, A, Platzsky, Land Shapiro, J. West Coast Regional Development Study. 
Development Action Group, November 1993. 
4. Fitschen, A. Sustainable Economic Growth- A study ofSaldanha!Vredenburg. School of 
Economics, University of Cape Town (not for publication). Prepared for Biannual 
Conference, September 1997. 
5. Fitschen, A. The Economic Impact of Saldanha Steel Within the West Coast Investment 
Initiative. Compiled for the Industrial Strategy Project, University of Cape Town, 
November 1997. 
6. Fitschen, A. Cooking up a Growth Meal~ Does the Proposed West Coast SDI have the 
Recipe for Success? School of Economics, University of Cape Town (not for publication), 
May 1997. 
7. Lee, Kyu Sik. Decentralization Trends of Employment Location and Spatial Policies in 
LDC Cities. August 1983. 
8. Lee, Kyu Sik. Location of Jobs in Developing Cities. Finance and Development. December 
1989. 
9. Lee, Kyu Sik. Cholla Region catches up with Korea: The Role of Local Governments. 
Operations Evaluations Department World Bank. 25 September 1996. 
10. Lee, Kyu Sik and Sang-Chuel Choe. Changing Location Patterns of Industries and Urban 
Decentralisation Policies in Korea in Korean Economic Development edited by Jene K 
Kwon Greenwood Press Connecticut. 
11. Lewis, D and Bloch, R. Spatial Development Initiatives: Infrastructure, Agglomeration 
and Region in Industrial Policy. Prepared for Trade and Industrial Policy Secretariat 
Annual Forum. 23 September 1997. 
12. Maasdorp, G. Introductory Survey. In The South African Journal of Economics. 
52.2.1990. 
50 
IB P Y 
J lc
 
  o  Mri
 . 
  a  . 
 o  th o l
. 
 
S  b b
 b eal - b Ol b b
l
. o

















13. Markusen, A. Interaction between Regional and Industrial Policies. Evidence from four 
countries. Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 
1994. 
14. Martin, R. Hanival, S. and Pretorius, L. Strategic and Environmental Assessment of the 
Saldanha Region (Pilot Study). For the Environmental Monitoring Group, April 1996. 
15. Morgan, K. The Learning Region - Institutions, Innovation and Regional Renewal 
Department of City and Regional Planning. Papers in Planning and Research. The University 
of Cardiff, May 1997. 
16. Provincial Development Council. The Western Cape. A Socio-economic Profile, A 
Provincial Development Council Publication, October 1996. 
17. Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa. Interim Strategies- A Ten Point Plan 
First Draft Discussion Document, 18 August 1995. 
18. Public Works Department. Public Works Towards the 2r' Century, Green Paper, Pretoria, 
1996. 
19. Renaud, Bertrand. National Urbanization Policy in Developing Countries. World Bank 
Research Publication. Oxford University Press, 1979. 
20. Saldanha Steel Project. Procurement Optimization of Local Resources. Procedure no. 
00200\p\0014, 23 July 1996. 
21. Saldanha Steel Project. Local Content Reporting and Inviocing. Procedure no. 
00000\p\0011, 23 July 1996. 
22. Saldanha Steel. Report on Optimization of Local Resources and Community 
Involvement- Executive Summary, 25 May 1997. 
23. Saldanha Steel Project. Local Resource Optimization: Suppliers List. Project Team 
Memo to all Contractors and Sub-contractors 20 January 1997. (SSPS\ML\7087). 
24. Saldanha Reconstruction and Development Forum. Saldanha Economic Development 
Workshop. (Compiled notes by Wilfred Wentzel), 20 January 1996. 
25. Stoodley, K.D.C. Lewis, T. and Stanton, C.L.S Applied Statistical Techniques. Halsted 
Press. Published by Ellis Horwood Limited, Chichester. 1980. 
26. Storper, M. Institutions of the Learning Economy. School ofPublic Policy and Social 
Research, UCLA. Revised Presentation to Conference on Employment and Growth in 
Knowledge Based Economy, November 1994 Copenhagen. Revised September 1995. 
51 
































27. Storper, M. & Walker, R. (1989) The Capitalist Imperative: Territory, Technology and 
Industrial Growth, Basil Blackwell, New York. 
28. Taylor, Van Rensburg, Vander Spuy and Visser (Town and Regional Planners) Weskus 
Grondhervorming Distriksplan- Ekonomies Insette. April1997. 
29. Tomlinson, R. The Cost-Effective Industrial Location Policy. In The South African 
Journal of Economics 58.2.1990. 
30. Dr J. H. van der Merwe and Prof. C. L. McCarthy. Ruimtelik - Ekonomiese Ondersoek vir 
Vredenburg-Saldanha. Instituut vir Kartografies Analise Universiteit van Stellenbosch, 
August 1990. 
31. West Coast Investment Initiative Appraisal Document Produced for the West Coast 
Investment Initiative Technical Team- November 1997. 
32. West Coast Investment Initiative: Conceptualisation Workshop. Project manager Dr 
Laurine Platzsky. Saldanha Bay Protea Hotel, 19 May 1997. 
52 
  . 
  
l splan Jo il 1
 . 
EeoD rn
  f  D
ub
 i






















The West Coast Spatial Development Initiative: Procurement at 
Saldanha Steel Project 
Comp~yN~e:. _____________________________________ ___ 
Telephone number:. ________________________ ,~----
Postal Address:. _______________ _ 
Respondent:----------------------·---
:it" 
' I I 
any Narne:  _ 
her:  ~ ___ _ 
t l : ___ __ _ 
------------











The \Vest Coast Soatial Development Initiative: Saldanha Steel Project 
Evaluation of Procurement Policv: Saldanha Steel Suppliers Questionnaire. 
I. Did your firm come to rhe Saldanha\Langebaan\Vredenburg (SVL) area because ofthe 
Saldanha Steel Project (SSP)" 
If YES: Did vour firm : 
lf~O: 
Establish a new branch\ franchise 
Relocate from West Coast 
Relocate from Western Cape 
Relocate from another other Province 
How long have you been in the SL V area?-----------
How do you see the impact of the Saldanha Steel Project on existing firms? 
3. Has the influx of new firms into the SLV area added to competition in your line of 
business? 
How has your firm reacted ? 
Adjusted prices 
Range of products\services 
Increased Srock Levels 
Other 
~. \'vl1ar affect has the SSP project had on your business prospects in the area? 
Jt\IPROVED I I" NO EFFECT I I HAR..\IED I 
5. How has you business been affected by the arrival of SS? 
Turnover 
;'\lo. of employees 
CJpltJI production cquipmcnr 
S~n ICC support ~qlllprnent 
Pr~nllsl!s 
ncreased Decreased Unchanged 
' p:1ti l e f ti :  
  l  O M
Ol  nn [0 t aan\ Y  t  
?
[ ; y nn
I  N : 
l
n
 l     i  t  Y rea? -",-,:-;:---,----:---,..-,--;=--o 
. t Y
i '  
:
j t  i  
r t  \Servi
 t   
t r 
. \Vl t   t        S i   r a: 
1 1\1 PROVE     1 ..
.    i     t    55  
r r 
:"110.  I!l11ployees 
a ital r tioll e i e t 












o :\parr from the SSP directly which of the followmg have Impacted on your business" 
Improved infrastructure in SL \' :!re:: 
fncreased General Business Activity 
Spin-offs from Service/Supply to other 
Businesses involved with SSP 
7. Have Management and \or employees gained lea met! new skill as a result of increas(>d 
business activity? 
8. If YES. were these skills obtained by? 
Formal training courses 
On the job training E3 
9. Does your firm provide any product and \or service that will be required by Saldanha Steel 
in d1e operational phase? 
I YES I 
I 0. Did you propose business with Saldanha Steel in the form of~ 
Official Tender Contracts (Sealed Bid R:\0.000-) 
Fax Quote\Enquiry basis (less than R:\0,000) 
I J. Were you successful in your: 
Sealed Bid\Tender Bid 
Fax \Enquiry quoted Bid 
Jt" 
I 2 If your Tender Bid or Quote Bid was unsuccessful : 
Were you given feedback from Saldanha Steel" 
E3 
E3 
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14. Besides the above, ic; there any reason in your opinion that your Tender\quote was 
unsuccessful? ---------------------------------------------------
15. Did you ever miss the opportunity to Tender \Bid due to the lack of timeous information? 
I YES I 
16. Do you have any complaints about the Tender or Quote Enquiry System of Saldanha Steel? 
I YES I 
If Yes : What Were T11ey? -----------------
Did you voice these complaints? 
I YES I 
To whom did you voice your complaints? 
:~· 
What response did you receive? 
  "  
. 'i
unsuccessful? _______________________ _ _ 
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17. \Vl1ile quoting or tendering on SS contracts did ~ou l~am an~ thing new about? 
The Tendering process 
Your competitive position in the market E3 
Explainyourexperiences ________________________________________ __ 
18. Did you adjust your range of products and\or s~rvices because of Saldanha Steel contracts? 
Expanded product range or sen·ices 
Diversified 
Specialised 
Could you explain these changes? __________________________________ _ 
19. Do you see these adjustments as pem1anent? i.e. Remaining beyond the building phase of 
the Saldanha Project'? 
I YES ' 
20. Did you improve your products or service to meer SSP standards or acquire the contract? 
I YES I 
Comment~ 
2 I . \Vl1at do you perceive as the f;~ors limiting your bus messes· growth potential') 
Size ofSLV 
Distance from od1er major centres 
Lack of skilled labour 
lack of capital 
Other 
C ommenr on other factors! -----------------------------------------
W lll   ering: all   Oll earn t ing: :J [ : 
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22. Have your expectations of Saldanha Steel's impact on growth in the area been fulfilled? 
I YES I I TO SOME EXTENT I 
23. In addition to what has been done, what do you think could still be done to improve 
business prospects in the area? 
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